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Professor  Kautz,  a  political  theorist,  tells  lawyers  to  stick  to  our
lasts.'  We ought to do only  law and  refrain  from seeking  assistance
from political theory. This is not, however, because we are likely to
do badly as  consumers  of political  theory. Rather, Professor  Kautz
insists  on  a  reasonably  sharp  distinction  between  roles.  Political
theorists "educate the public mind," whereas lawyers, in our capacity
as  lawyers,  do  law.  Of  course,  in  other  roles  lawyers  may seek  to
educate  the public mind as well.  And there,  I  think, lies one of the
two problems  I wish to address here. I doubt that a sharp distinction
can be drawn between doing law and educating the public mind. My
second  difficulty  is  that  Professor  Kautz's  sense-I  cannot  call  it
more than that, in light of the allusiveness  of his comments-of what
law  "is" seems to me  substantially  inaccurate.  These  two problems
are  related:  Precisely because  the outlines of the  law are  less clear
than  Professor  Kautz  appears  to  believe,  the  distinction  between
doing law and educating the public mind is quite thin.'
For the moment, let me accept the  distinction between  doing law
and educating  the  public  mind. The  difficulty  with that  distinction
comes  in  Professor  Kautz's  final  section,  where  he  turns  from
political theory to social criticism. In this section he sharply criticizes
*  Carmack  Waterhouse  Professor  of Constitutional  Law,  Georgetown  University  Law
Center.
1.  To mix a metaphor.
2.  Part of the difficulty lies in Professor Kautz's unelaborated  reference  to law. Although
he  is  not  explicit,  the tenor  of  his comments  seems to  be  that law  consists  of the  coercive
imposition of sanctions or foreclosure of opportunities. (Or at least the creation of a bargaining
structure enforced by the threat of coercive sanctions against those who seek to gain advantage
by  acting  outside the  law's  bargaining  structure.  I doubt  that much  turns on  the distinction
between  law  as  (direct)  coercion  and  law  as  creating  a  bargaining  structure  enforced
(indirectly)  by coercion,  and so  I will speak  only of law as coercion in what  follows.)  So, for
example, he  does not concern himself with the proposition that the courts may conduct a vital
national seminar, see Eugene Rostow, The Democratic Character  of Judicial  Review, 66 HARv.
L. REv.  193,  208 (1952),  or act as republican  schoolmasters, see Ralph  Lerner,  The Supreme
Court as Republican Schoolmaster,  1967 Sup. Cr. REV. 127.
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Ronald Dworkin for urging a "fusion of constitutional law  and moral
theory."3  As Professor  Kautz  sees  things,  Professor  Dworkin  in  so
urging  fails  to  respect  the  proper  limits  of  law.  The  difficulty,  of
course,  is  that  Professor  Dworkin  is not  acting  as  a  lawyer  when
urging  this  fusion,  for  he  is  not  exercising,  or  even  directly
participating  in the  exercise of, law's coercive power. Indeed, in this
section Professor Kautz does not mention a single decision by a court
or even an argument any lawyer actually made to a court.
Professor Dworkin is of course trained as a lawyer, and he was the
principal  author of  a brief submitted  to the  Supreme  Court  in  the
assisted-suicide  case. But, importantly, that brief was also published
in  the  New  York  Review of Books  In  this  connection  John  Hart
Ely's  famous  quip  comes  to  mind  as  indicating  what  Professor
Dworkin's  enterprise  is.  Like  Professor  Kautz,  Professor  Ely
believed that Professor Dworkin  typically makes arguments  that  he
thinks  courts  ought  to  appropriate  directly.  Professor  Ely  wrote,
"The  Constitution may  follow  the flag, but  is it really  supposed  to
keep up with the New  York Review of Books?" 5  But  the very fact
that  Professor  Dworkin's  essays  are  published  in  the  New  York
Review  of Books  rather  than, for  example,  as  briefs  submitted  to
courts  shows  that  the  essays  are  not  part  of  Professor  Dworkin's
practice  of  law. Rather,  in  these  essays  he  is  acting  as  a  political
theorist, writing  articles  and  books  that he  hopes  will educate  the
public mind. Of course, like any political theorist, Professor Dworkin
might  be mistaken  about what our political  society  or legal  system
ought to do. His political theory might be wrong and the public mind
would be miseducated were it to learn from him. I suppose Professor
Kautz's comments might be taken as a criticism of that sort. But then
we need to consider the means by which political theorists succeed in
educating the public mind.
Here Professor Kautz's model is the statesman, who holds a set of
principles  (good  ones,  we  hope)  and  acts  to  lead  the  public  to
conclusions it would not immediately accept.'  Dissenting in Romer v.
Evans, Justice  Scalia criticized  the  majority  for  "imposing  upon  all
Americans  the resolution favored  by the elite  class from  which  the
Members  of this  institution are  selected."7  Suppose,  however,  that
3.  Steven Kautz, Liberty, Justice, and the Rule of Law, 11  YALE J. L & HUMAN.  435,  458
(1999)  (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING  RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149 (1st ed 1977).
4.  Ronald Dworkin, Assisted Suicide: The Philosophers'  Brief,  N.Y.  REV. BOOKS, Mar. 27,
1997,  at 41.
5.  JOHN  HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND  DISTRUST 58 (1980).
6.  I  use the  term statesman deliberately  and  because of, not despite, its masculinist  cast,
which emphasizes the narrow arena of the tradition in which Professor Kautz writes.
7.  517 U.S. 620, 636  (1996)  (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the majority was not "imposing"  a solution, an issue  I take up later.
Consider the possibility that the justices  in the majority  were acting
as  statesmen.  Then  the  criticism  that  they were  acting  as  an  elite
would be misplaced. The statesman's relation to the public  is that of
leader to follower, or of elite to the masses.
The  statesman's  actions  are,  in  the  standard  term,  prudent,
structured by the statesman's awareness  of a gap, which  he seeks to
close, between what justice requires and what the public is at present
able  to  accept.  So,  for  example,  Abraham  Lincoln  acted  in  a
statesmanlike  way  in  signing  the  Emancipation  Proclamation.  Its
strict  terms  had  a  quite  limited  scope  but  it  announced  a  general
principle  that  Lincoln  hoped  the  people  would  come  to  accept,  in
part because he issued the Proclamation.
Now  consider  Professor  Dworkin  as  a  statesmanlike  political
theorist. Professor Kautz argues that liberal political theory contains
a thin commitment to the rule of law as a means of ensuring liberty
through  security,  and  a  thicker  commitment  to  more  precisely
defined  principles. But, he argues, the public does not (yet?)  accept
the  thicker  commitments,  which  therefore  are  inappropriately
enforced  coercively  through  law.  Professor  Dworkin  is  of  course
concerned  about  liberalism's  thicker  commitments.  He  may  know
that Rawls's principles of justice are not yet acceptable to the general
public, even if they do state the truth about  distributive justice.'  He
also certainly knows that the courts  as they are presently constituted
are  not going  to  adopt  Rawls's  principles  to  guide  their  coercive
imposition  of law. But, acting  as  a statesman  whose job is  political
theory  (rather  than,  for  example,  executive  leadership  as  was
Lincoln's),  Professor  Dworkin  writes  books  and  articles  aimed  at
reshaping popular  and judicial  understanding of the proper  role  of
courts.  And Professor  Dworkin  could  believe  that, by  the  time  his
work has been assimilated by the courts, people will in fact willingly
consent to Rawls's principles. As a prudent political theorist, that is,
Professor Dworkin  pursues  a program of educating the public mind
so  that  the  people  will  someday  consent  to  the  principles  of
liberalism, both thin and thick.
Of  course  this  picture  of Professor  Dworkin's  activity  could  be
mistaken.  Perhaps  Ronald  Dworkin  would  be  ecstatic  to  awaken
next week to read that the Supreme Court has unanimously decided
to adopt Rawls's principles of justice as the correct interpretation  of
8.  I  do  note  that  in  my  view  Professor  Kautz  misreads  Rawls's  position  in  Political
Liberalism. I  believe that  Rawls rather  clearly  does not believe  that his principles  of justice
state  a "truth  beyond popular consent."  Political  liberalism  is a method  of ordering political
society  that, Rawls believes,  will lead  in  the  long  run to popular consent  to his principles  of
justice. See JOHN RAWLS,  POLITICAL LIBERALISM  (1993).
1999]
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the Equal Protection Clause  even though the people were unwilling
to  accept  those  principles.  I  doubt  that  Professor  Dworkin  is  so
deluded  as to believe that this fantasy will be realized. Living  in the
real  world,  we  ought  to assess  his books  and  articles  as  efforts  in
political theory, not law, and in so doing we need to have some idea
about how substantive political theories work their way into coercive
law. To be cogent, Professor Kautz's criticisms of Professor Dworkin
and  others  must  rest  on  an  account  of  the  connection  between
educating  the  public  mind  and  imposing  coercive  law.  Because
Professor Kautz does not provide the needed  account, his criticisms
are ultimately unsupported.9
My  second  concern  is  that  Professor  Kautz's  account  of law  is
imprecise. He describes his image of law early in his paper. It should
be "established, settled, [and] known," and applied by "a known and
indifferent judge."'"  The burden of jurisprudence in this century has
been to show that these criteria cannot be met by any system of law.
I do  not wish to  restate  in detail  the well-known  criticisms of legal
formalism  except  to  assert  that  the  criticisms  seem  to  have
established-as  a  truth  about  law-that  any  reasonably  complex
legal  system  will  contain  incompatible  rules  and  principles.  The
effect  is  to  have  a  legal  system  whose  rules  and  principles  are
established,  settled,  and  known  in the  abstract,  while  at  the  same
time having a rather wide range of uncertainty  about the application
of  the  rules  and  principles,  even  by  an  indifferent judge,  in  every
particular  case."  If these  criticisms  are  correct,  the  rule  of law  on
which  Professor  Kautz  places  so  much  weight  cannot  do  what  he
believes it must.
Most legal theorists  have responded  to these criticisms by seeking
to salvage,  not abandon, the rule  of law.  Professor  Kautz criticizes
one such response, which asks judges to supplement their reliance on
legal  rules and  principles  with  reliance  on political  theory.  On the
surface, his criticism  is that legal  rules and principles either need no
supplementation or cannot be supplemented  consistent with the rule
9.  I note in  passing another danger that arises when political theorists (or lawyers)  engage
in social criticism.  The danger is  that their (or our) social criticism will  lack empirical  support.
So, for example, Professor Kautz writes of a decline of popular self-government,  focusing  on
the displacement  of popular consent by judicial  decision.  Recent  events suggest  a somewhat
different  story. No one appeared to  take seriously  the possibility  that the courts would have
intervened in the impeachment process, and to the extent that the people  appeared to have  a
view  on the matter our  representative institutions,  not our judicial  ones, appeared  to be  the
ones displacing popular consent. But, I hasten to add, that too is a statement of social criticism,
susceptible to the same evidentiary challenge I raise against Professor Kautz.
10.  Kautz, supra note 3, at 448 n.52.
11.  Professor Kautz's only reference to this position is through a quotation from Professors
Farber and Sherry,  which (wrongly)  conflates the indeterminacy claim with a claim about  the
social function of indeterminacy. See Kautz, supra note 3, at 458 n.68.
472
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of law. In either version,  however, that  criticism  is unresponsive  to
the dilemma exposed by legal theorists.
Even more, Professor Kautz's understanding of coercive law seems
to  me  deficient  in  ways  that  explain  his failure  to  understand  why
some  legal  theorists think  that law  needs  assistance  from  political
theory.  At  the  end of his  paper Professor  Kautz  contrasts what he
calls  "the  general  consensus  about  freedom  of speech"  with  "the
partisan  controversy  about certain privacy  rights."'2  I suppose  there
is  a  consensus  about  freedom  of speech  in  the  abstract;  virtually
everyone,  I  presume,  would  respond  to  a  survey  by  saying  they
strongly  agreed  with  the  proposition  that  the  United  States
Constitution  does  and  should  protect  freedom  of  speech.3  The
difficulty comes, of course, in specifying what activities are protected
by freedom  of speech: flag-burning?  distribution of sexually explicit
but non-obscene  material  on the Internet? hate  speech?  large-scale
expenditures  on  political  campaigns?  And  this  difficulty  is  quite
general.  We  can,  and  may  often,  find  wide  agreement -popular
consent-on  abstractly stated legal rules and principles,  while at the
same  time finding  equally wide  disagreement  about the  application
of those rules and principles to particular controversies. If the rule of
law requires general agreement about the latter, it is in deep trouble,
from which, some legal theorists have thought, political theory might
rescue it.
I  have  elsewhere  distinguished  between  the  "thin"  Constitution
and the "thick"  one. 4 The thin Constitution consists of the principles
of the Declaration of Independence  and the Constitution's preamble,
which  I  summarize  as  a  national  commitment  to  universal  human
rights  defensible  by  reason. In  my  view  the  thin  Constitution  has
broad public acceptance.  The thick Constitution gives more  precise
content to these  principles.  Professor Kautz criticizes  the courts  for
enforcing  their particular  understandings  of the  thick  Constitution,
which  he  describes  as  "private  judgment[s].""  But,  properly
understood, Professor Kautz's position requires  a far more extensive
libertarianism  than  he  is  willing  overtly  to  endorse.  The  thin
Constitution leaves  wide  latitude for disagreement  about its precise
content. For example,  the thin Constitution  accommodates  regimes
12.  Kautz, supra note 3, at 467.
13.  Again  I think it worth noting a certain  slipperiness in Professor Kautz's formulation. I
would  think that  there is  an  equally high  consensus  on "certain"  privacy  rights,  such  as  the
right of married  individuals to use contraception.  I would guess that the consensus is nearly as
high  with respect  to the use of contraception by unmarried  adults. And these, of course,  were
the rights at issue in Griswold v.  Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),  and Eisenstadt  v.  Baird,  405
U.S. 438 (1972).
14.  MARK TUSHNET,  TAKING THE CONSTITUTION  AWAY FROM THE COURTS 9-14 (1999).
15.  Kautz, supra note 3, at 458.
1999]
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in  which  flag-burning  legislation  is  enforced  and  in  which  such
legislation never is adopted. 6 But flag-burning legislation is, after all,
coercive  law, and it embodies a contestable  private judgment about
the  thick  Constitution's  content.  The  only  escape  from  private
judgment  enforced  through  law  appears  to  be  a  thorough-going
libertarianism.  But,  I  would  think,  the  defense  of libertarianism  is
likely to rest on private judgments too.
In  fact,  Professor  Kautz  offers  another  criticism  of  efforts  to
supplement  law  with political theory. This criticism  is responsive  to
the  dilemma  posed  by  the  law's  (moderate)  indeterminacy,  but  it
may  well  be  inadequate.  It  is  not,  according  to  this  criticism,  that
legal rules and principles cannot or should not be supplemented, but
rather  that  political  theory  provides  the  wrong  kind  of
supplementation.  Here  I  recur  to  Professor  Kautz's  discussion  of
statesmanship.  Suppose,  contrary  to  his  express  argument,  that
judges  as well  as  executive  officials,  citizens,  and  even  lawyers  can
sometimes  be  statesmen. The idea would then be that judges, faced
with conflicting legal rules and principles and as a matter of law able
to  resolve  a  particular  controversy  in  divergent  ways  equally
compatible  with  law,  should  choose  the statesmanlike  course.  The
law is supplemented  by the statesman's wisdom.
Two recent Supreme Court cases illustrate statesmanship  at work,
and  the  difficulties  with statesmanship  as  a  solution  to  the judicial
dilemma  described  by legal  theorists. The joint  opinion  in Planned
Parenthood  of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.  Casey opened  with  the
sonorous sentence,  "Liberty  finds  no  refuge  in  a  jurisprudence  of
doubt," 7  and at the key analytic point asserted that its decision was,
and  had  to  be,  guided  by  "reasoned  judgment." 8  Washington  v.
Glucksberg asserted that  the  courts  should  assess  claims  that  some
right is protected by the due process clause only after coming up with
a  "careful  description"  of the  asserted  right. 9 These  phrases  sound
good:  Who  could  favor  "unreasoned  judgment"  or  "careless
description"?  But  they have  almost  no substantive  content.2 0  What
they do, however, is signal to the public that the judges are acting  as
statesmen  and  stateswomen  rather  than  expressing  their  private
judgments about right and wrong.
What, though, does statesmanship mean in the judicial context? In
16.  See TUSHNET,  supra note 14, at 106.
17.  505 U.S. 833,  843 (1991).
18.  Id. at 849.
19.  117 S.  Ct. 2258, 2260 (1997).
20.  This  is  evident  in  Glucksberg, where  it  is  trivially  easy  to  come  up  with  a  careful
description of a  right to assistance  in committing  suicide  in  some circumstances;  indeed, five
justices appear to have done so.
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Glucksberg the Court held that there was no general right-today-
to assistance in committing suicide  in cases  of some sorts  of medical
distress,  but it  left  open  two possibilities:  expressly,  the  possibility
that the people would revise that judgment through the enactment of
legislation protecting the right; and, implicitly, the possibility that the
courts would revisit the constitutional claim  as social experience with
assisted  suicide  (overt  or  covert)  accumulates."  These  two
possibilities  are  the  judicial  equivalent  of  the  Emancipation
Proclamation. They combine  a message  about the importance  of the
issue  and point  in the direction  of an appropriate  resolution  (some
protection for the right under some circumstances),  but await public
consent before imposing the resolution as a matter of coercive law.
The  three Justices  who  wrote  the  joint  opinion  in  Casey clearly
thought they were  doing something quite similar. They  identified  a
fixed point of justice, which they called the "central holding"  of Roe
v.  Wade.'  They  acknowledged  the  claims  made  against  Roe  by
expressing  some  doubt  about  Roe's  correctness  "as  an  original
matter."'  They opened up a range of regulation for public debate by
upholding some regulations of abortion that were previously barred,
and they  introduced  the  theme  of gender  equality  into  the  law  of
abortion  in  a  way  that  might  caution  the  public  against  adopting
other regulations and might lead the public to think differently about
the abortion issue more generally.
And yet the question surely remains open: Did the Justices  act in a
statesmanlike way in Casey? As Madison wrote in The Federalist  No.
10,  we  have  to  design  our  institutions  on  the  assumption  that
"statesmen  will  not  always  be  at  the  helm."24  Madison  knew  that
executive officials would not always be statesmen,  even though they
might  think  of  themselves  as  statesmen.  So  too  with  judicial
statesmen.  Professor  Kautz  argues  that  legal  rules  and  principles
cannot be supplemented  by political theory because political theory
is  a form  of  private judgment  inappropriate  for governing  political
society. It is unclear  to me that the  alternative his paper suggests, of
supplementing  legal  rules  and  principles  with  the  statesman's
wisdom, is any better, in large measure because I doubt that we have
public  criteria  for  distinguishing  between  statesmanship  and
willfulness,  between  actions  that  appropriately  lead  the  public
toward justice and 'actions that impose the judges' private judgments
under the guise of wisdom and statesmanship.
21.  Justice  Souter's  opinion  was  explicit  on  this  point.  See  id. at  2291-93  (Souter,  J.,
concurring).'
22.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 860-61.
23.  Id. at 871.
24.  THE FEDERALIST No.  10, at 44 (James Madison) (Everyman's Library, 1911).
1999] 475
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But perhaps  this  is  too  pessimistic.  In conclusion,  I  suggest  two
paths out:  one is  a rejection  of the  rule  of law  as  Professor  Kautz
conceives  it  that  nonetheless  might  promote  the  value  of  security
that he places  at the heart of the liberal democratic order; the other
is  a  backhanded  defense  of  statesmanship,  political  theory,  and
indeed  anything  else  anyone  might  offer  to  supplement  the  legal
rules and principles that legal theory says are inadequate to the task
of promoting security.
The first path is Madisonian. The trick here is to make security and
rights  self-enforcing.'  Set  ambition  against  ambition  and  we  may
arrive at security and justice  even though  no one aims  at  doing  so.
Madison's  most  ingenious  explanation  is  this:  Assume  that  all
legislators  are  purely  or  predominantly  self-interested.  Gather
enough  of  them  together,  and  their  conflicting  self-interests  will
cancel each  other  out. In one version the residue  is  the  legislators'
minor interest in promoting the public good. 6 In another version the
residue  is  the  legislators'  self-interest  in  getting  something done;
barred by others from pursuing narrow projects of self-interest, they
can  only  accomplish  something  if the project  they pursue  is in  the
public interest.
Of course it is unclear that Madison's model of a self-enforcing set
of rights fits either  historical or present reality. And its extension to
judges  is  even  less  clear.  Certainly  there  is  no  cancellation  or
constraint  within the  judiciary.  The  formal  constraints  outside  it-
impeachment,  restriction  of jurisdiction-have  proven  to  be  quite
weak. What  we  might call  informal  constraints, however,  might  be
rather strong. These  informal constraints  on judicial power  suggest
the  second  path,  which  returns  us  to the process  of educating  the
public mind with which I began.
Suppose  judges  announce  a  decision  purporting  to  impose
coercively  their private judgment  on some  matter, a judgment  that
the public cannot yet be reasonably be expected to accept. The mere
announcement  does  not  mean  that  the  public  will  be  coercively
subjected to that judgment. Decisions have  to be  implemented,  and
there is good reason to believe that decisions substantially out of line
with what  important  elites  (at  least)  support  will  have  little  social
impact."  The  overall  process  of  law-making,  that  is,  may  induce
something like statesmanship in the system as  a whole, even  though
no judge, legislator, or executive actually is a good statesman.
25.  I offer a more detailed analysis of self-enforcement in TUSHNET, supra note 14, ch. 5.
26.  In the more detailed  analysis  I  call this  residue the value-based  incentives legislators
have. See id.
27.  Here  the  formal  mechanism  of  control  of  the  judiciary  through  irregularly  timed
appointments to a life-tenured  bench may play an important role.
8
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If this  last  suggestion  is correct,  Professor  Kautz's  worries-and
those of nearly everyone exercised by the apparent demonstration in
modern jurisprudence  of problems  with  the  concept  of the  rule  of
law-might  disappear. Pretty much no matter what  anyone  does  or
says, the conditions of security in a liberal democracy are established
by  the  overall  complexity  of  the  institutions  of  government  in
modern liberal democracy.
9
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